LastPass vs Dashlane

LastPass and Dashlane both describe zero-knowledge vaults, but their current cryptographic baselines have diverged. LastPass documents AES-256 with PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations; Dashlane has been migrating remaining PBKDF2 vaults to Argon2d and adding device-key and confidential-computing layers around its vault architecture.

Where it stands out

LastPass's current security documentation specifies AES-256 encryption, PBKDF2-SHA256 with 600,000 iterations and local encryption and decryption. The plaintext master password is not stored on LastPass servers.

That is a conventional, clearly documented model with a fixed baseline that users do not need to tune themselves in order to understand how the vault key is derived.

Trade-offs to weigh

Dashlane's 2026 architecture is moving the opposite direction in KDF design: remaining PBKDF2 vaults are migrated to Argon2d, while device-specific keys and AWS Nitro Enclaves add separate protection around trusted endpoints and cloud cryptographic operations.

Where it stands out

Dashlane's Argon2d migration is automatic for supported vaults, and its security documentation extends the zero-knowledge model to passwordless, security-key and SSO accounts as well as traditional master-password accounts.

The device-key design means a new device generates its own separate key and must be verified before it can participate in vault decryption, adding another trust boundary beyond knowing the account credentials.

Trade-offs to weigh

The comparison is therefore between two documented architectures rather than a generic security score: LastPass uses a fixed 600,000-round PBKDF2-SHA256/AES-256 model; Dashlane has moved its vault baseline toward Argon2d with additional device and confidential-computing protections.